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The semantics of a simple language for describing tightly coupled "synchronous" 
systems is defined. An operational semantics i given by term rewriting rules and a 
consistent fully abstract denotational semantics i  defined based on the concept of 
observable behavior and advanced fixed point theory. Particular properties of the 
language are analysed and especially algebraic laws of the language are discussed. 
Finally some aspects and problems of the formal definition of the semantics of such 
a language are treated also comparing them to other approaches found in the 
literature. © 1984 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A simple version of a language for describing synchronous concurrent 
systems is introduced. This language called CP can be seen as a simplified 
version of Milner's calculus of communicating systems (CCS, cf. Milner, 
1980a, b) or Hoare's communicating sequential processes (CSP, cf. Hoare, 
1978). Apart from some not very significant details it is identical with a 
language introduced by Hoare to talk about semantic aspects of CSP. Its 
operational semantics is defined by term-rewriting rules. Its denotational 
semantics is defined based on the idea of nondeterministic stream processing 
functions. The special representation of the denotational semantics is 
motivated by an experimental environment. This gives a clear notion of 
processes as deterministic or "nondeterministic" (set-valued) stream 
processing functions. The fixed point theory for communicating processes i
based on the ideas of (Broy, 1982), where the meaning of a recursive 
definition of a stream processing function is defined by a particular fixed 
point that can be characterized by combining distinct power domains. Thus 
a fully abstract denotational semantics i  derived for CP, which is proved to 
be consistent with the operational semantics. 
Afterwards algebraic properties of the language are analysed and 
discussed. Finally other aspects and problems arising when giving a formal 
semantics to CP are investigated. In particular a number of further 
possibilities for the semantic representation of processes are discussed. 
Problems arising there are related to abstractness of the representation a d 
fixed point theory. 
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2. SYNTAX 
We use a very simple language CP following (Hoare et al. 1981). It can 
be seen as the simplest version of a language for describing synchronized, 
concurrent systems. Its syntax in BNF reads: 
(agent) ::= skip 
abort 
(action) -* (agent) 
(agent) or (agent) 
(agent)] (agent) 
(agent)]Kaction set)(agent) 
(agent) ; (agent) 
(agent)\(action) 
(id) 
(id) :: (agent) 
immediately terminating process 
nonterminating process 
process tarting with the resp. action 
simple nondeterminatic choice 
guarded choice 
parallel composition 
sequential composition 
hiding of actions 
identifier for agent 
recursively defined agent 
Here we assume that a countable set ACTION is given for the objects taken 
from the syntactic entity (action) and a set (id) of identifiers for agents. By 
(action set) we denote the set consisting of arbitrary sets of actions from 
(action). 
3. OPERATIONAL SEMANTICS 
As a first step we give an operational semantics. This is done for several 
reasons. First, an operational semantics does not lead into the complex 
problems of powerdomains that have to be dealt with in mathematical 
semantics. Second, formalized operational semantics guarantees that the 
concepts incorporated in the language actually can be implemented. Third, it 
serves as a complementary definition such that the "correctness" of 
mathematical ("denotational") semantics can be verified. Fourth, it helps to 
understand where the particular problems of mathematical semantics come 
from, since the "abstraction" mapping the operational semantics into the 
mathematical one can be made explicit. 
3.1. Term Rewriting Rules for CP 
Operational semantics is defined by the introduction of a ternary partial 
relation OP, i.e., a partial predicate 
OP: (agent) X ((action) U {~}) X (agent) -~ {true, false}. 
We assume, that c is an element hat does not occur in the set ACTION. 
This predicate is defined as a least fixed point of a set of conditional 
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equations. For better eadability we write 
p l  a ~p2 
for OP(pl, a, p2)=true. Intuitively this means that the agent pl  may 
perform the action a and then behave like the agent p2. If a = e then we 
speak of a silent transition. The relation OP is a "rewriting rule with output" 
or a "rewriting rule indicating an event." 
Now we define OP by induction on the terms of sort agent (where 
x _ ACTION or x = e): 
abort ~ abort, 
x+p~p,  
pl  o rp2-%pl ,  
p l  orp2 -~p2,  
pl-~pAxq:e=~(Pllp2) x p, 
pl X~pAx~e=~(p2[pl) ~p, 
pl ~p~pl  [p2-~p]p2, 
pl ---~p=>p2 [pl  ---~p2 [p, 
skip I a ~ a, 
a I skip ~ a, 
pl  ~p3 Ap2 x ,p4 A x E c =~pl [l~p2 - -~p3 ]l~p4, 
pl *,p3 A-~(x~ c)=~pl II~p2--~p3 II~p2, 
pl --Z-,p3 A -~(x ~ c) :~p2 II~pl -~p2 II~P3, 
skip IIc skip ~, skip, 
pl X,p3==>pl;p2 X>p3;p2, 
skip; p ~, p, 
q::p --~ p[(q::p)/q], 
qE( id}=~q ~,q, 
pl X~p2Ax~a=~pl\a ~p2\a, 
pl ~' ,p2~pl\a~p2\a,  
skip\a ~, skip, 
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The only agent hat is terminal in a defined way in the relation -~,  i.e., that 
definitely cannot be reduced, is the agent skip. We use the axiom: 
OP(skip, x,p) = false. 
So the agent skip represents he only agent where we definitely say that there 
is no successor. So it represents the process that has properly terminated. 
Here p[pl/q] denotes the agent arising from p by replacing all free 
occurrences of q by pl.  So the reduction rule for recursively defined agents 
simply corresponds to fl-reduction. Of course, we assume that name clashes 
between bound identifiers and identifiers occuring freely in pl  are resolved 
by appropriate renaming of bound identifiers (a-reduction). 
We take for OP the least defined relation, i.e., the least fixed point, that 
fulfils the laws above. According to (Broy and Wirsing, 1982) such a 
relation exists. Note, that for a deadlock (with a ~e b) such as 
(a -~ skip II~ b -~ skip), 
where e = {a, b}, the relation 
(a --* skip [Ic b -~ skip) x ~P 
is not defined, or more precisely, 
OP((a -~ skip IIc b --* skip), x,p) 
is not defined for all agents p and all actions x not for x = e. According to 
the fact that OP is a partial relation, the assertion 
pl X,p2 
(or more precisely, OP(pl, x, p2)) can be true, false, or not defined. If for 
some agent p l  this relation is false for all actions x and all agents p2, then 
we say that the agent p l  has properly terminated. In our language skip is the 
only agent that has properly terminated. If the relation is undefined for all 
actions x and for x = e and all agents p2, then p l  is called a deadlock, and 
we write 
deadlock(pl). 
If there is a sequence of agents {Pi}i~N with Po =p l  and 
Pi e)Pi+l, 
643/61/3-3 
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then we say that p l  has the possibility to diverge and write 
diverge(pl). 
3.2. Streams 
For giving a more abstract semantics to agents we introduce the notion of 
streams. Basically a stream is defined by a sequence of atoms. So let ATOM 
be some given set of atomic values (including the natural numbers and the 
truth values, for instance). By ATOM -c the classical flat domain over ATOM 
is denoted, i.e., the partially ordered set with just 2_ as the least element and 
all other elements incomparable. By ATOM* we denote the finite sequences 
of elements from ATOM, by ATOM ~ the infinite sequences. Then the set of 
streams is defined by 
STREAM(ATOM) =: (ATOM* X {2_ }) U ATOM* U ATOM °° 
This definition represents the union of all finite partial streams with all finite 
total and all infinite (and total) streams, if we use the ordering for streams 
sl, s2, defined by 
S lEs2c~s l=s2  or s l=s3o(±)ands3 ispre f ixo fs2 .  
By (a) the one-element sequence is denoted consisting just of the atom a 
from ATOM ~. The symbol ° is used to denote the usual concatenation of 
sequences to sequences. By "&" we denote the operator adding an atomic 
element as first element o a stream, i.e., 
a & s = (a) ° s for a E ATOM, 2. & s = (2.), 
is assumed. Note, that & is leftstrict. By e the empty stream is denoted. For 
streams we use the two functions 
first: STREAM(ATOM) ~ ATOM ~, 
rest: STREAM(ATOM) -~ STREAM(ATOM) 
which are defined by 
first(e) = first((&)) = 2., first(a & s) = a, 
rest(e) = rest((&)) = (2.), rest(a & s) = s. 
With these definitions we immediately may prove 
LEMMn. STREAM(ATOM) forms an algebraic domain; the functions 
first, ".&.", and rest are monotonic and continuous. 
As pointed out in (Broy, 1982) streams are a very basic notion in 
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concurrent communicating systems. In systems based on shared memory one 
has to consider streams of states, in tightly coupled systems one has to 
consider streams of actions. 
3.3. Transitive Closure of the Rewriting Relation 
Since we want to abstract from the "single" steps in computations we 
introduce a second partial relation OP*, 
OP*:(agent) X ACTION* X (agent)~ {true, false}, 
and write 
p l  s >p2 for OP*(pl, s,p2) = true. 
It is defined by the least defined relation that fulfills 
p l  X~p2~ pl  (~-p2, 
8 pl  "~p2~ pl  ~p2,  
,2 ~xg~. p3" p l  Sl>p2 Ap2- - ->p3~pl  
Moreover we introduce a set-valued function 
cap: (agent) ~ P(STREAM(ACTION)), 
defined by 
cap(p) = {s E ACT ION* :p -~ ~ . skip} 
U {lub{si o (3_)}: {si}i~ u c_ ACTION* 
A ~{ai}ie u ~ ACTION±: Vk E N: 
3pl,p2 E (agent):p S%pl  
A (pl  ~t !~.  p2 ASk+ 1 = S k 0 (ak)) 
V ((deadlock(pl) V diverge(pl)) A s k = Sk+ 0}. 
A stream s E cap(p) is called a run ofp. Note, that this particular definition 
has been chosen according to the principle of finite observability. The set of 
capabilities is determined by the set of finite runs (runs with a bounded 
amount of "time") of the system. This definition nontermination and 
deadlocks are treated the same way. Based on these notions we can now 
discuss appropriate abstractions for the operational semantics. 
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3.4. Abstractions from Operational Semantics 
The operational semantics defined in the preceding sections can be 
perfectly taken as definition of the meaning of CP. However, such a 
semantics is not very abstract. And abstraction from unimportant details is 
badly needed if one wants to cope w i th the  enormous combinatorial 
complexity found in a communicating, concurrent system. So now we are 
going to study several possibilities of abstraction. 
The operational semantics defined in the preceding section defines for 
every term p of the syntactic unit (agent) a finitary (i.e., finitely branching) 
finite or infinite tree, with terms of sort (agent) as labels in the nodes and 
arcs labelled by actions. This tree will be denoted by T(p). If we forget 
about the labels in the nodes and just keep the tree-structure the arcs of 
which are labelled with the actions (or with e) we obtain a first simple 
abstraction from the operational semantics. These trees will be denoted by 
A T(t). Formally one has 
T: (agent) ~ TREE, 
A T: (agent) -~ ACTIONTREE. 
Of course one could give a "denotational semantics" to CP formalizing AT 
(cf. Francez et al., 1978; and de Bakker and Zucker, 1982). 
However, the abstraction obtained by AT is not very strong. It just 
abstracts from the particular way in which a recursive agent is defined (such 
as bound identifiers) and from sequential notation. This leads to the 
question: which abstraction is strong enough? And we have to be carefull, 
too, not to abstract oo much and to forget about important properties of an 
agent. But what are the important properties of an agent and what are the 
unimportant ones? For solving this question we adopt a simple notion of 
observable behavior. 
Given an agent p the one thing we assume that we can observe are the 
action that the agent executes if we start it. Then p performs a run, i.e., we 
obtain a stream s with 
s c cap(p). 
Moreover, we can use p for building other agents, i.e., we may construct an 
agent C[p] such that p is a subterm of C[p] and then observe the actions 
that are executed if we start C[p]. Thus we obtain a run sl of C[p] with 
sl E cap(C[p]). 
This means, that the semantic identity of an agent p is not only determined 
by cap(p) but also by the behavior of C[p], i.e., by cap(C[p]) for arbitrary 
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contexts C[.]. This means that we should be able not only to observe the 
behavior of p itself, but also the effects o fp  within any system C[p], i.e., 
what happens if we put p in some given context C[.]. This fixes our notion 
of observability (cf. Broy and Wirsing, 1981). Note, that it is essential that e- 
transitions are not observable here nor the particular shape of an agent after 
having performed a sequence of actions. 
Based on this notion of observability we can now talk about the 
"abstractness" of a semantic model. Assume we have found a semantic 
representation for agents by mapping them into some set PROCESS. Then 
the semantic mapping 
S: (agent) ~ PROCESS 
has to have the property that it is a homomorphism from the term-algebra 
(the set of terms or programs of the syntactic unit (agent)) into the semantic 
model PROCESS. So for every language construct in CP, for instance, 
parallel composition IIc, there has to be a semantic operation, such as 
par:: (ACTION SET)-o PROCESS X PROCESS ~ PROCESS 
with 
S[al lie a2] = par(e)(S[al], S[a2]); 
s has to keep all the relevant information for an agent for using the agent as 
subcomponent. 
In addition the abstraction of the operational behavior should be kept by 
S. Accordingly S is called extensionally equivalent (or consistent) o (the 
behavior specified by) the operational semantics, if there is some function 
CAP: PROCESS ~ P(STREAM(ACTIONS)) 
with 
CAP(SIP]) = cap(p) 
for all agents p. This means that Fig. 1 has to commute. 
<agent> S PROCESS 
P (STREAM (ACTION))  
FIGURE 1 
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However we are not satisfied by some S that keeps too much information 
about a process. We want S to keep exactly as much information as 
necessary for S to be consistent and fulfilling the composition property 
above. The composition property can nicely be expressed by contexts. For a 
program term C[a] of the syntactic unit (agent), where a occurs at a 
particular position, C is called a context. The semantics S is called abstract 
(w.r.t. the extensional behavior defined by the operational semantics 
described above) iff for two agents pl ,  p2 we have 
S[p l ]  = S[p2] if for all contexts C: cap(C[pl]) = cap(C[p2]). 
Note, that for this notion of observability it is essential not to forget about 
the contexts, i.e., about the possibility of observing the behavior of a system 
of processes after integrating the given process into a system of other 
processes (cf. Hennessy and Milner, 1980). A semantics S is called fully 
abstract iff S is consistent and abstract. 
Including the consideration of contexts is sufficient o obtain models for 
CP. One possibility to obtain concrete models is to define term-oriented 
representations (cf. Hennessy and Plotkin, 1980) by specifying an 
appropriate congruence relation on the set of terms of the syntactic unit 
(agen 0. We even may construct a fully abstract semantic model in the form 
of the behavior term algebra along the lines of (Broy and Wirsing, 1981). 
However, term-oriented semantic models generally have the severe draw- 
back that they do not support he intuition very much. So we adopt a notion 
of experiment in the following section that leads to a denotational semantic 
model and finally to a fully abstract one much more helping our 
understanding. 
4. DENOTATIONAL SEMANTICS 
According to what has been said above, a process P cannot simply be 
represented by its capabilities, because in certain contexts C agents P1 and 
P2 with identical capabilities may nevertheless lead to agents C[P1] and 
C[P2] with distinct capabilities. This shows that also other properties of the 
process P are important (its "incapabilities") to define the capabilities of 
C[P]. According to this we choose a particular idea of "experiments." 
4.1. Experiments 
For a better understanding and also for defining a mathematical semantics 
for CP based on the idea of powerdomains, it is important to develop a clear 
notion of a determinate process. Since in CP there are concepts of global 
nondeterminism (expressed by [) as well as concepts of local nondeterminism 
(expressed by or), such a notion has to be chosen very carefully. 
SEMANTICS OF COMMUNICATING PROCESSES 211 
For explaining our choice we adopt a particular model of experiment for 
testing the identity of a process. The test machinery consists of a processing 
unit in which the CP program is loaded and of a display together with a key 
board on which actions can be chosen. After loading a CP program an 
experiment proceeds as follows: 
(0) The machine may display "terminated." Then the experiment is
finished. 
(1) The experimenter chooses an arbitrary action and presses the resp. 
button on the keyboard. 
(2) The machine displays either "rejected" or "accepted" or it may 
not give an answer at all (divergence, nondetermination). 
(3) The experimenter may finish the experiment or (s)he may continue 
according to 0. 
If the machine displayed "terminated," then further input according to (1) 
cannot change this behavior. 
According to these experiments a process is called determinate, if for 
repeated experiments with the same process and a chosen sequence of actions 
it shows always the same behavior, otherwise (the behavior of) the process is 
called nondeterminate. Note, that with this model of experiments neither e- 
transitions nor the internal state of the machinery are observable. 
4.2. Denotational Semantics of Nonrecursively Defined Agents 
According to the experimental philosophy described above a determinate 
process is a function from 
STREAM(ACTION)-~ STREAM(/A, g t). 
An object from STRAM(ACTION) is called an experiment, an object from 
STREAM({A, R }) is called a behavior. The relationship to the experimental 
environment above is as follows: termination is expressed by the empty 
stream e, nontermination by ±, acceptance or rejection by A or R, respec- 
tively. Note, that for our purposes it is sufficient o consider just partial 
streams as experiments, but it is important o have both partial and total 
streams as behaviors. A nondeterminate process then simply is a function 
with a set of possible behaviors for every experiment, namely an object from 
PROCESS = [STRAM(ACTION) -~ P(STREAM(IA, R t))]- 
For defining the meaning of terms of the syntactic unit (agent) with free 
identifiers we use the classical technique of environments: 
ENV = [(id}-o PROCESS]. 
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As usual the replacement of a process given under identifier q in an 
environment E by some other process p is denoted by E[p/q]. In pat'ticular, 
we have 
q = ql ~ E[p/q](ql) =p, 
q 4= ql =~ E[p/q](ql) = E(ql). 
Now we are going to define the meaning of agents by translating them into 
nondeterminate stream-processing functions. This translation is represented 
by the semantic function S, 
S: (agent) -~ ENV ~ PROCESS. 
The function S is defined inductively on the terms: 
The Immediately Terminating Agent: The agent skip immediately ter- 
minates. 
S[skip](E)(s) = {~}, 
The Never Terminating Agent: The agent abort immediately enters a 
nonterminating loop. 
S[abort](E)(s) = {(±)}, 
The Agent Performing a Determinate Action: The agent a-~p has just 
the capability to accept he action a (all other actions are rejected) and then 
behaves like p, 
S[a -,p](E)(s) = {f(q, s, a): q E S[p](E)(h(s, a))}, 
where f and h are stream-processing functions defined by the least fixed 
points of the equations 
f (q ,a&s ,a )=A &q, 
a q: a' =~f(q, a' & s, a) = R &f(q,  s, a), 
h(a & s, a) = s, 
a 4= a' => h(a' & s, a) = h(s, a). 
So the agent a~p rejects all actions in the experiment s until the first 
occurrence of the action a. This action is accepted and for the remaining 
stream h(s, a) of experiments he agent behaves like p. 
Nondeterministie Choice: The agent p l  or p2 has the free choice to 
behave like p l  or like p2, 
S[p l  or pZ](E)(s) = S[pa ](E)(s)• S[p2l(E)(s). 
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So the set of behaviors of for pl or p2 is just the union of the behaviors ofpl  
and p2. 
Joining Capabilities: The agent pl ]p2 behaves like pl or p2, however, 
if some action is offered, then it may only be rejected if both processes are 
ready to do so, 
S[pl IpZ](E)(s) 
= { g(ql, q2): ql E S[pl](E)(s)/X q2 E S[pZ](E)(s) 
V q2 E S[pl](E)(s) A ql ~ S[p2](E)(s)}, 
where g is the stream-processing function defined by the least fixed point of 
the equations 
g(A & q, q2) = A & q, 
g(q, e) = q = g(e, q), 
g(R & ql, R & q2)=R & g(ql, q2), 
g(R & ql,A & q2) =A & q2. 
The agent pl ]p2 joins the capabilities of agent pl and p2 with respect o 
accept actions, but can only reject an action if both pl and p2 are ready to 
do so. So a defined behavior ofpl  is only a feasible behavior ofpl  ]p2 if it 
starts with A for accepted or if there is a behavior of p2 which is empty or 
starts with a R for rejected. This is expressed by the function g. 
Sequential Composition: The agent pl ;p2 denotes the sequential 
composition of pl and p2; as soon as pl has terminated the agent continues 
behaving according to p2: 
S[pl;pZ](E)(s) = {hl(ql, q2): ql E S[pl](E)(s) 
A q2 E S[p2](E)(h2(ql, s))}, 
where hl and h2 are the least fixed points of the equations 
h 1 (e, q2) = q2, 
h2(e, s) = s, 
hl(X& ql, q2) =X& hl(ql, q2), 
h2(X & q, s) = h2(q, rest(s)). 
So the prefix of the experiment s is given to the agent pl until pl has 
properly terminated with the behavior ql and the remaining experiment 
h2(ql, s) is given to p2. The produced behavior of the agent pl;  p2 then 
simply is obtained by the "left-strict" concatenation of ql to the behavior 
produced by p2. 
Parallel Synchronized Composition: The agent plllcP2 defines the 
synchronized (with respect o e) parallel composition of agents pl and p2. 
For actions from e the processes join their possibilities to reject, but they can 
only accept he action if both are ready to do so. For actions not from e they 
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join their capabilities to accept actions, but they may only reject an action if 
both are ready to do so, 
S[pl  IlcP2](E)(s)= 
{par(ql, q2, d, s): 
ql E S[pl](E)(fork(s, d, 1)) A q2 E S[p2](E)(fork(s, d, 2)) 
A d E {0, 1, 2} ~ A pos(ql, q2, d, s) E true}, 
where fork, par, and pos are the least fixed points of the equations 
fork(e, d, n) = e, 
fork(x & s, 0 & d, n) = fork(x & s, n & d, n) = x & fork(s, d, n), 
m ~ n A m 4: O=~ fork(x & s, m & d, n)= fork(s, d, n), 
par(e, e, d, s) = e, 
c A X=R)  V c) A X=A)  
~par(q l ,  X&q2,  2&d,  x&s)=par (X&q l ,  q2 ,1&d,x&s)= 
X& par(ql, q2, d, s), 
(X=A ~ x E c) ~ par(X & ql, X& q2, 0 & d, x & s) =X& par(ql, q2, d, s), 
par(R & ql, e, 0 & d, x & s) = R & par(ql, e, d, s), 
par(e, R & q2, 0 & d, x & s) = R & par(e, q2, d, s), 
pos(e, e, d, s) = true, 
pos(e, X & q, 1 & d, s) = pos(X & q, e, 2 & d, s) = false, 
pos(R & ql, e, 0 & d, x & s) = pos(ql, e, d, s), 
pos(e, R & q2, 0 & d, x & s) = pos(e, q2, d, s), 
c A X=R)  V c) AX=,4)  
~pos(q l ,  X&q2,  2&d,  x&s)=pos(X&ql ,  q2, 1 &d, x&s)= 
pos(ql, q2, d, s), 
c AX=A) A c) AX=R)  
pos(X & ql, q2, 1 & d, x & s) = pos(ql, X& q2, 2 & d, x & s) = false, 
(X=A =~ x E c) ~ pos(X & ql, X& q2, 0 & d, x & s) = pos(ql, q2, d, s), 
~(x E c) ~ pos(A & ql, A & q2, 0 & d, x & s) = false, 
pos(A & ql, R & q2, 0 & d, s) = pos(R & ql, A & q2, 0 & d, s) = false. 
In a parallel composition pl  I[cp2 the two agents can do rejections of 
actions that are not in c only together, i.e., they join their capabilities for 
accepting those actions. For actions in c, however, they can do acceptances 
only together synchronously, but they join the capabilities for rejecting those 
actions. In the formal definition above d can be seen as the "scheduler" that 
distributes the actions of the experiment to one of the processes or to both of 
them. The partial predicate pos indicates whether this distribution is actually 
feasible. 
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We have chosen this lengthy definition of parallel composition, because 
we found it more systematic than a more tricky shorter one. Moreover it 
allows for a simpler proof of monotonicity and continuity properties. 
Hiding: The agent p\a denotes the agent resulting from hiding the 
action a: explicit input of a is rejected, but arbitrary numbers of hidden 
offers of a are added: 
S[p\a](E)(s) = {hide(d, ql, s, a): 
ql C S[p](E)(include(d, s, a)) 
A d E {0, 1 }~ A apos(d, ql, s, a) c_ true}, 
where hide, include, apos, and rpos are the least fixed points of the equations 
include(0 & d, a & s, a) = include(d, s, a), 
x :/: a ::> include(0 & d, x & s, a) = x & include(d, s, a), 
include(1 & d, s, a) = a & include(d, s, a), 
hide(d, e, s, a) = e, 
hide(0 & d, X & q, a & s, a) = R & hkie(d, X& q, s, a), 
a 4: x ::> hide(0 & d, X & q, x & s, a) = X & hide(d, q, s, a), 
hide(1 & d, X& q, q, a) = hide(d, q, s, a), 
apos(d, ~, s, a) = true, 
apos(0 & d, X & q, a & s, a) = false, 
a v~ x :~ apos(0 & d, A & q, x & s, a) = apos(d, q, s, a), 
a v~ x ::> apos(0 & d, R & q, x & s, a) = false, 
apos(1 & d,A & q, x & s, a) = apos(d, q, x & s, a), 
apos(1 & d, R & q, x & s, a) = rpos(d, q, x & s, a), 
rpos(d, e, s, a) = true, 
rpos(0 & d, X & q, a & s, a) = rpos(d, X & q, s, a), 
a 4: x ~ rpos(0 & d, A & q, x & s, a) = apos(d, q, s, a), 
a 4: x :~ rpos(0 & d, R & q, x & s, a) = rpos(d, q, s, a), 
rpos(1 & d,A & q, x & s, a) = apos(d, q, x & s, a), 
rpos(1 & d, R & q, x & s, a) = false, 
The definitions of apos and rpos simply say that an agent p\a may only 
reject some action b (:/:a) i fp  is also capable (possibly after accepting some 
hidden offers) to reject the hidden offer of the action a. 
Identifiers for Agents: The meaning of an identifier is simply taken from 
the environment, 
S[q](E) = E(q). 
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This way the behaviors of nonrecursively defined agents are fixed for all 
finite and infinite experiments. Note, that the auxiliary functions are all 
continuous. The definition of the semantic function S can be mainly seen as 
an exercise in defining the auxiliary stream-processing functions, i.e., writing 
applicative programs. 
4.3. Reeursively Defined Agents 
As it is well -known, the treatment of recursively defined agents as fixed 
points is the most complicated part of the denotational semantics for 
concurrent programs. The main reason is that classical fixed point theory 
based on exactly one domain with one partial ordering does not work. 
4.3.1. Semantics of recursively defined agents. Given a recursively 
defined agent 
q: :p, 
we may associate with it a functional for every environment, 
Tq=:p: ENV ~ PROCESS ~ PROCESS 
defined by 
Tq:w(E)[ pl ] = S[ p](E[ pl/q]). 
Now following classical techniques we would like to define the semantics 
S[q::p](E) of q::p to be the "least" fixed po in t fo f  the equation 
f(s) = Tq:w(E)[f](s ) for experiments s. (a) 
Now (1) is an equation between sets. So we have to fix a partial ordering 
between sets for indicating in which sense the fixed point should be least. 
The classical orderings on powerdomains (see Appendix) do not work 
properly because they are only quasi-ordering for sets over nonflat domains 
such as the domain of streams. Inclusion ordering for the power set does not 
work since we do not want to consider agents with empty sets of behaviors 
and so we are missing a least element. 
However, if we exclude the empty set, then the power set (without the 
empty set) ordered by set inclusion just forms a predomain. We can solve 
fixed point equations in predomains for monotonic and continuous 
functionals if we manage to replace the missing least element by some 
auxiliary construction. This auxiliary construction can be based on power- 
domains. 
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We do not give the basic definitions of power domains here but just refer 
to the Appendix. Note that in the following "."  is used to denote functional 
composition. Throughout this section we consider only environments which 
contain only processes p with CONE(p(s) )~ PD(STREAM({A, R }) for all 
experiments s and, where CONE.p  is _E*-monotonic, E*-monotonic, E*  M- 
monotonic, E*-continuous, E*-continuous, and _E'M-continuous. Such 
processes and, respectively, such environments are also called perfect. 
THEOREM. For every CP-program p and every perfect environment E, we 
have 
(1) the funetonal Tq..w(E ) is ~-monotonie and closely union 
continuous, 
(2) the funetionaI PDOM.  Tq..:v(E ) is E'M-monotonic and E* M- 
continuous, 
(3) the functional PMDOM. Tq::p(E) is E*-monotonie and E_*- 
continuous, 
(4) the functional PEDOM.  Tq::p(E) is E*-monotonie and E*- 
continuous. 
Proof See Appendix. 
Now we can define the meaning S[q::p] of the agent q::p as a fixed point 
of the functional Tq..w(E), i.e., we have 
S[q::p](E) = Tq:w(E)[S[q::p](E)]. (2) 
This equation does not characterize S[q::p](E) uniquely, in general. In 
particular, now we have 
(1) to prove that the class of functions fulfilling these equations is 
nonempty; 
(2) uniquely define which function of the class is to be taken. 
We define the function S[q::p](E) in three steps: At first we define 
approximations SP and MIN.  SP in the powerdomains of erratic and 
demonic nondeterminism, resp., such that we are sure that 
MIN.  SP[q::p](E) ~_* S[q::p](E) ~* SP[q::p](E). 
Since the set of closed sets without the empty set is a predomain if ordered 
by set inclusion, we can use MIN • SP[q::p](E) in place of the missing least 
element. So based on these approximations we constructively can prove the 
existence of a fixpoint of (2) and define S[q::p](E) uniquely. 
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The approximation SP[q::p](E) for S[q::p](E) is defined by a fixed point 
equation in the powerdomain of erratic nondeterminism, such that intuitively 
for the required S[q::p](E): 
SP[q::pl(E) = PDOM. S[q::Pl(E). 
should hold. Define 
SP[q::p l(E): STREAM(ACTION) ~ PD(STREAM( {A, R })) 
as the least fixed point f (in the domain of erratic nondeterminism) of the 
equation: 
f(s) = PDOM(T0:..,(E)If] (s)). 
This fixed point is well defined since Tq..p(E) . . . .  is E'M-monotonic and E*eM- 
continuous. 
LEMMA. SP[q:'.p](E) is consistently defined, EEl-monotonic, and EEM- 
continuous. 
Now we can also try to solve our fixed point equation in the powerdomain 
of demonic nondeterminism. This can be simply done by the functor MIN, 
that maps our solution in the powerdomain of erratic nondeterminism into 
the powerdomain of demonic nondeterminism. 
MIN. SP[q::p](E): STREAM(ACTION) -~ PM(STREAM({A, R })), 
represents a solution f of the equation 
f (s ) = PEDOM( To::p(E )[f ](s) ). 
Now surely all minimal behaviours, i.e., the elements of MIN.  
SP[q::p](E))(s), are possible behaviours. Furthermore we want exactly that 
set of behaviours that includes these minimal ones and those that have 
definitely to be included for fulfilling the fixed point property. So we define 
S[q:'.p](E) as the Z *-least function with 
MIN.  SP[q::p](E) ~* S[q::p](E) ~* SP[q::p](E), 
that is closed and that fulfills the specifying fixed point equation (1). 
Proof of the existence of S[q::p](E) (constructive). (1) Define a family of 
functions 
S,[q::p](E): STREAM(ACTION) ~ P(STREAM({A, R })) 
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So[q::p](E ) = MIN.  Se[q::p](E), 
Si+ ,[q::p](E) = CLOSE.  Tq::p(E)[Si[q::p](E)]. 
(2) We have 
Si[q::p](E ) ~* Si+ ,[q::p](E), 
because all language constructs are _~*-monotonic in S[q:'.p](E) and 
So[q::p](E) 
= MIN • SP[q:.'p](E) (because of the fixed point property) 
= MIN .  PDOM.  Tq::p(E)[So[q::p](E)] 
_*  CLOSE.  Tq::p(E)[MIN. PDOM.  So[q::p](E)] 
= CLOSE.  Tq::p(E)[So[q::p](E)] 
= S1 [p::q](E). 
(3) Define 
S[q::p](E) = (')*{z E PROCESS:  
M IN .  SP[q::p](E) ~_* z A z 
-= CLOSE.  Tq::p(E)[z]}. 
since all language constructs are union-monotonic, according to Knaster and 
Tarski S[q::p](E) is well defined and a fixed point of the defining 
equations. II 
Note, that all processes that can be defined in our language are perfect, 
i.e., for perfect environments E and for all agents p we know that S[p](E) is 
perfect. Since Tq::p(E) is closely union continuous we obtain a corollary 
similar to Kleene's fixed point theorem. Let $2 denote the process with 
~(s)  =- (±)  for all experiments s.
COROLLARY. 
S[q::pl(E) = CLOSE.  ({,_) * Tq::p(E)[EM -- lub{MIN • TJq::p(E)[$2] }]). 
In analogy to the classical fixed point theorem we can use this duality 
between the fixed point characterization and the lub-characterization for 
proving the consistency of operational and denotational semantics. 
4.4. Consistency with Operational Semantics 
Now we have two independent definitions of the meaning of CP, an 
operational one and a denotational one. It remains to prove that both 
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coincide w.r.t, the defined capabilities. For doing so we introduce the 
function 
CAP: PROCESS ~ P(STREAM(ACTION)) 
defined by 
CAP(P) = {s: 3i E N: s ~ ACTION i A A; E P(s)} 
0 {s: 3iE N :s  C ACTION i × {±}: 
Va C ACT ION:A lo  (±)CP(s  o (a}) 
V A' o (R & (±)) ~ P(s o (a & (±}))} 
() {s E ACTION ~ :A ~ E P(s)}. 
Now let the environment E 1 be defined by 
E ±(q) = Y2. 
for every identifier q. 
The consistency of operational and mathematical semantics can be seen 
by the following theorem. 
THEOREM. For every CP-program p we have 
cap(p) = CAP(S[p](E I) ), 
i.e., S[p](E±) is extensionally equivalent o the operational semantics and 
hence S is consistent. 
Proof See Appendix. 
Now we have proved that our denotational semantics is extensionally 
equivalent with the operational one, i.e., it is neither inconsistent nor too 
abstract. But our denotational semantics could carry too much information, 
i.e., it could be not abstract enough. This is true as it can be seen from the 
following example programs: 
p l  = (b ~ e -~ skip) or (b -~ skip I skip)  or (b -~ e ~ skip I c ~ skip),  
p2  = (b -~ skip)  or (b --* skip I skip) or (b -~ e -~ skip I c -~ skip).  
We have 
R &A &A &eES[p l ] (c&b&e&e) ,  
~(R &A &A &e E S [p2] (c&b&e&e) ) ,  
but 
cap(C[pl  ]) = cap(C[p2]) 
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for any context C. Actually S is not abstract enough. However, we can 
abstract from S by introducing a slightly modified semantic function 
SI:  (agent) -~ ENV - PROCESS 
specified by 
S1 [p](E)(s) = {strip(q): q E S[p](E)(s)}, 
where strip and forget are the least fixed points of the equations: 
strip(e) = e, 
strip(A & q) = A & strip(q) 
strip(R & q) = R & forget(q). 
forget(e) = e, 
forget(A & q) = (5_), 
forget(R & q) = R & forget(q). 
S1 is fully abstract as can be seen by the following theorem. Note, that the 
definition of CAP does not make any difference if we use S1 instead of S. 
THEOREM. The denotational semant&s defined by S1 &fully abstract. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
So the denotational semantics defined by S1 is fully abstract, i.e., a 
semantic model which is as abstract as possible, but still consistent with 
extensional behavior defined by the operational semantics. 
Note, that we can define $1 exactly the same way as S. The only thing we 
have to change is definition of S in Section 4.2 inserting strip on all right- 
hand sides of the definitions. The fixed point theory then can be used exactly 
the same way. The equivalence with the operational semantics is also 
trivially guaranteed, since for CAP only sequences from {A}*× {R}* are 
considered. We can even define an experimental environment corresponding 
to S1, where an experiments ends as soon as the first time some offer has 
been accepted after a nonempty sequence of offers has been rejected. We 
have just preferred to work with S since we found the experimental 
environment more suggestive. 
S1 is fully abstract, since an agent may be influenced by the context in 
which decision to take at most for the next visible action to perform. If we 
would have language constructs (generalizing the joining of capabilities by 
]), where the nondeterministic choice of an agent can be influenced over a 
finite sequence of offered actions, then S would become a fully abstract 
semantic model. 
643/61/3-4 
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5. PROPERTIES OF CP  
In this section we are going to analyse a number of properites of CP. First 
we look at properties of the semantic functions. Then we investigate 
algebraic properties of CP. 
5.1. Properties of Processes 
By the denotational semantics every CP process is mapped (for every 
environment) onto a set-valued function. But not all functions can be 
obtained this way. The functions have particular properties. For instance 
they are monotonic and continuous in the ways defined in the previous 
sections. But there are further characteristic properties. For talking 
conveniently about these properties we introduce the length Is] of a stream s
defined by 
Ys E ATOM' I s ° (±)l = Isl = i, 
gs ~ ATOM °° Isl = oo. 
LEMMA. Let f=S[p] (E )  for some CP-program p. Then for every 
experiment s and every behavior q we have 
(1) q E f (s )  =~ jq[ <~ Is[, i.e., the length of the behaviors is bounded by 
the length of the experiments. 
(2) ql o (R) o q2 ~f(s l  o (a) o s2) A Iql] = [sl[ ~ ql o q2 C 
f ( s l  o s2), i.e., a rejection does not change the "state" of a process. 
(3) Is1 -- l A Isll--[qll =~ -~(ql o R z+l o (A) o q2 G f ( s l  o (a) o s o 
(a) o s2)), i.e., one rejected a'ction cannot be accepted as long as all other 
actions offered in the meantime are rejected. 
(4) For all finite q G {A,R}', sE  ACTION J with j>  i+ 1: ~(q o (R) o 
e Gf(s))  A ~(q o (R) o (L)  Gf(s)),  i.e., if a process is able to reject, it has 
not terminated nor diverged so far. 
Proof. Structural induction on the definition of S. I 
This lemma clearly shows that rejected otters are input that does not affect 
the further output of an agent. 
5.2. Algebraic Properties 
An important concept for increasing our understanding of the semantic 
concepts of the language CP is to study its algebraic properties. Finding out, 
which agents are extensional equivalent (i.e., bahave abstractly the same) 
and which are not, of course helps us basically to understand the semantic 
concepts. One even may define the meaning of CP this way (cf. Broy and 
Wirsing, 1982). However, since we have already fixed the semantics by 
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denotational/operational means we now can prove the following algebraic 
properties of CP: Here for agents pl,  p2 we define 
pl ~p2 i f fSl[pl]  = Sl[p2]. 
Assoeiativity laws: 
(pl [p2)[p3 ~p l  ] (p2 ]p3), 
(pl;p2);p3 ~pl ;  (p2;p3), 
(pl orp2) orp3 ~p l  or (p2 orp3), 
(pl I[cp2)[lop3 ~p l  IIc (p2 Hop3), 
Commutativity laws: 
(pl [p2) ~ (p2 [pl), 
(pl orp2) ~ (p2 orpl), 
(pl Ilcp2) ~ (p2 Ilcpl), 
Distributivity laws for or: 
p or p ~p,  
(pl orp2)[P ~ (pl IP)or (p2 [p), 
(pl orp2);p ~ (p l ;p)or  (p2;p), 
p; (pl orp2) ~ (p;pl)  or (p;p2), 
(pl orp2)HoP ~ (pl [[~p) or (p2 [IcP), 
x -~ (pl orp2) ~ (x -~pl) or(x ~p2), 
Laws for ]: 
p[p..~p, 
p [ skip ~ p, 
(x~p l )  [ (x ~p2)~x~ (pl orp2), 
((xl ~PO[ "'" [(x. --+p.));p ~ (x, ~ (p~;p))[ ... [(x. ~ (p. ;p)), 
Laws for skip and abort: 
abort; p -,~ abort, 
p; skip ~p ~ skip;p, 
abort I1~ abort ~ abort, 
skip [[~ skip ~ skip, 
(P [1~ abort) ~ (p I[~ abort); abort, 
Laws for hiding: 
skip\a ~ skip, 
abort\a ~ abort, 
(a ~p) \a  ~p\a,  
x #: a => (x -+p)\a ~ x -~ (p\a), 
(pl orpZ)\a ~ (p l \a)  or (pZ\a), 
(q ::p)\a = q :: (p\a), 
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Fixed point properties: 
q ::p ~p[(q ::P)/q]. 
All these algebraic properties can be easily proved by structural induction 
looking at the definition of the denotational semantics. 
6. COMPARISON TO OTHER SEMANTIC MODELS 
Giving a denotational semantics for concurrent processes, one has to face 
two essential problems: finding a semantic representation for agents and 
specifying the semantics of recursively defined agents as a particular solution 
for the fixed point equation for processes. 
6.1. Semantic Representations 
In the denotational semantics given for CP a CP-Program is mapped (for 
a given environment) onto a rather simple semantic representation: a process 
is a function mapping experiments into sets of behaviors. However there are 
many other ways to represent agents semantically. 
Throughout this section we want to consider example program t, 
q :: ((a -~ q; b -~ skip) or (c -~ skip) or q). 
6.1.1. CP-programs as trees. Our operational semantics gives a finitary 
tree for every program. For t we obtain the infinite finitary tree, tree(t) of 
Fig. 2a and for t]a the tree of Fig. 2b. 
Now we want to abstract from the e-productions, i.e., we want to delete all 
t-arcs. But for every node we want to keep the information about infinite 
paths (nonterminating computations) labelled by e only starting from that 
node. So such nodes will be labelled by _1_ now. We obtain for t the tree in 
Fig. 3a and for tla the tree in Fig. 3b. 
This shows that hiding leads to infinitary trees with nodes that have 
infinitely many branches. This is why hiding (even hiding the e-arcs) is 
noncontinuous, if we consider trees for the semantic representation f agents. 
Then the identity of the agent after having observed the action c is the union 
over all possible identities the agent actually (operationally) may have. Since 
after having observed the action c of the agent t\a the agent has only the 
capabilities to do a finite but arbitrary number of b's and then to terminate, 
there is no way to represent this agent by a finitary tree with arcs only 
labelled by b's and c's, without having an infinite path labelled by b's. This 
leads us to the problems of resumptions. 
The semantic function S1 induces a congruence relation on e-free trees 
that is exactly the congruence (cf. Hennessy and Ptotkin, 1980) that people 
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tried to axiomatize in other work (but which seems impossible in first- order 
algebraic equations). 
6.1.2. Resumption based semantics. In (Plotkin, 1976) there is already 
the suggestion to consider communicating processes as elements of the 
doman specified by the domain equation 
RES _~ [ACTION ~ P(ACTIONIU (ACTION × RES))]. 
Such a way of representing processes eems to be a very natural one in the 
light of operational semantics. A process is an individual that performs ome 
action and then becomes another process (or it may terminate or diverge). 
However, if a process passes a position of possible divergence successfully, 
there may be an infinite number of possible identities the process then may 
actually have. If we cannot observe which particular one is actually valid, 
the process semantically represents a "nondeterministic" individual 
consisting of an infinite set of processes. In particular it cannot be finitely 
approximated, i.e., that it is not a member of the powerdomain. 
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Thus apart from the domain problem, i.e., from the problem showing the 
existence of such a set and finding an appropriate ordering for it, the 
resumption of a process after having performed some action a may be an 
infinite set of processes (cf. the example above) that cannot be finitely 
approximated in the powerdomain: the function 
specified by 
resume: ACTION × PROCESS ~ PROCESS, 
resume(a,p)(s) = {q: A & q E p(a & s)}, 
is not continuous w.r.t, the powerdomain of erratic nondeterminism. More 
precisely it maps certain processes that are finitely approximable in the 
powerdomain of erratic nondeterminism onto processes that do not have this 
property. Thus it leads to unbounded nondeterminism, such that the ~EM- 
continuity of the basic language constructs is no longer valid. This can be 
seen by the examples of the tree representations above (consider esume(c, 
S[t\a](E±)); cf. also (Broy and Wirsing, 1982)). 
In (de Bakker and Zucker, 1982) a denotational semantics for concurrent 
processes i given based on metric spaces. There, however, c-productions are 
still contained. The semantic function is not abstract. Every behavior is total 
and thus maximal. Then the basic problems arising from power domains are 
avoided, but the resulting semantics i  less abstract and "more operational." 
One could speak of a "denotational operational semantics." So any of the 
three power domains of angelic, demonic, or erratic nondeterminism works 
without problems and gives identical results. 
6.1.3. Aceeptor and refusal sets. Other papers present semantic 
definitions that work with acceptor sets (also called "ready sets") or refusal 
sets (cf. Hoare et al., 198 I, B roy and Wirsing, 1982). As already pointed out, 
the identity of a process is not determined only by the set of all paths (runs) 
through its tree (this is only true for loosely coupled systems), since the 
operator ] and, similarly, the parallel combinator can be used to offer a set 
of actions simultaneously. The information about such sets is not contained 
in the set of all paths (runs). This is why sets of paths (runs, traces) are not 
sufficient (cf. Hennessy and Milner, 1980) as semantic representation. 
Our approach is isomorphic to the notion of an acceptor set or a refusal 
set. Given a sequence of actions s g ACTION i and a process f with 
Aio  (L )@f (s )  then a set of actions c_ACT ION is called an acceptor 
set after the observation of  s if c- -  {el,...,Cn} and with se= 
(c~ ~ (c~ & ... c. ~ s)), 
~(A i o R n o (5_) @ f ( s  o so)). 
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Sets that are not acceptor sets are called refusal sets (cf. Hoare et al., 1981). 
Since refused experiments do not change the state of our processes, our 
semantic representation a d the one using representations from 
ACTION* × P(ACTION) U ACTION ~ 
are isomorphic. However, our presentation is different from (Hoare et 
al., 1981) in the use of powerdomains and fixed point theory. 
6.2. Powerdomains Revisited 
In (Hoare et al., 1981) a fixed point theory is used, that just works in the 
power domain of demonic nondeterminism with a particular epresentation 
(cf. the Smyth power domain). In particular a process p is represented by 
H[p](E)(s) = {q: 3ql E S[p](E)(s): ql E_ q}. 
This means we work within the powerdomain of demonic nondeterminism 
using a _-maximal representation. So with this semantic representation we 
can simply use "reverse inclusion ordering" instead of EM. In particular we 
have 
S[pl](E)(s) E M S[p2](E)(s) iff H[p2](E)(s) c H[pl](E)(s). 
This explains the introduction of the particular process chaos. The semantics 
of chaos can easily be defined by 
S [ehaos](E)(s) = STREAM({A, R }); 
i.e., the agent chaos may produce any behavior for an experiment s. In the 
powerdomain of demonic nondeterminism, chaos is equivalent (we denote 
this equivalence by ~n) to abort, because 
H[abort ](E)(s) 
= {q: 2ql E S[abort](E)(s): ql E q} 
= {q: 2ql E {( l )}:ql  Eq} 
= STREAM({A, R }). 
And this explains ome of the surprising algebraic laws that can be found in 
(Hoare at al. 1981, p. 28), where, for instance, 
*skip ~H chaos 
holds with 
*skip = q :: (skip or (skip; q)). 
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We have 
and thus 
S[*skip](E)(s) = {e, (L)}, 
HI*skip] = H[chaos]. 
Other models (cf. Olderog and Hoare, 1982) are based on the powerdomain 
of angelic nondeterminism. If we choose the representation 
O[p](E)(s) = {q: ~ql E S[p](E)(s): q E_ ql }, 
we simply can use inclusion order instead of E~. In particular, 
S[pl](E)(s)E_ES[p2](E)(s ) iff O[pl](E)(s)c_ O[p2](E)(s). 
It is a representation that is sufficient for considerations concerning partial 
correctness. But now we have other funny equations like 
p ] abort Hop. 
Note, that neither O nor H are consistent with our operational semantics. A
semantic definition based on fixed point theory cannot work with just one 
power domain if our form of consistency with the operational definitions is 
required. However, the different congruence r lations induced by the different 
powerdomains correspond nicely to different notions of correctness. 
6.3. Notions of Correctness 
Every kind of assertion calculi introduces ome equivalence relation (in 
most cases a congruence relation) on the set of program terms. Two 
programs are considered to be equivalent, iff the same assertions can be 
deduced for them. For sequential deterministic processes the distinction 
between partial and total correctness i well known. There partial and total 
correctness induce precisely the same congruence relation on programs as 
the fully abstract denotational semantics. Thus the semantic models of both 
partial and total correctness are isomorphic to the fully abstract denotational 
model. 
For nondeterministic sequential programs this does not hold: calculi of 
partial and total correctness (cf. wlp-calculus and wp-calculus in 
(Dijkstra, 1976)) induce distinct congruence r lations on program terms. But 
taking the direct product (or the intersection) of both congruence relations 
induced by partial and total correctness we obtain a congruence relation 
which is identical to the one induced by the fully abstract denotational 
models. 
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In systems of nondeterministic communicating a ents not even this holds. 
Partial correctness means: "only correct output will appear, but it is not 
guaranteed whether there is output at all." This clearly indicates that we 
have only to look at maximal elements (with respect o the ordering on 
streams) in our set of possible behaviors. So the powerdomain of angelic 
nondeterminism is the right one for discussing partial correctness. 
In analogy to this, total correctness (in the restrictive sense of wp- 
calculus) means: "we are interested only in that output, that is guaranteed, 
i.e., where no divergence may occur." This very particular notion of total 
correctness has only to observe minimal elements in the set of possible 
behaviors. So it corresponds to the powerdomain of demonic nondeter- 
minism. 
The intersection of the two congruence relations yields the congruence 
relation induced by using the powerdomain of erratic nondeterminism, which 
does not coincide with the fully abstract denotational semantics. For a more 
thorough discussion of this issue see (Broy, 1983). 
6.4. Other Semantic Concepts 
For some of the constructs of CP the intended semantics is intuitively 
clear and there is not much choice. For others there basically is some 
freedom to define the semantics. This has to do with the strictness of 
operations. We call a binary composition e of agents trict iff for all CP- 
programs 
(1) aborttrp ~ abort, 
(2) po abort ~ abort. 
If (1) holds tr is called left-strict, if (2) holds then a is called right-strict; a is 
called semi-strict if for all p: 
(1) S[abort](E)(s) ~ S[abort  ap](E)(s), 
(2) S[abort](E)(s)~_ S[pa abort](E)(s). 
and semi-left-strict or semi-right-strict if (1) or (2), resp., hold. Of course 
every strict function is semi-strict, oo. If a construct is not semi-strict i is 
called nonstrict. 
Now we look at our four basic binary constructs in CP: 
(1) sequential composition expressed by ";", 
(2) parallel composition expressed by "llc", 
(3) free choice expressed by "or", 
(4) joining capabilities expressed by "[". 
That sequential composition should be left-strict and cannot be right-strict 
(not even semi-right-strict) is obvious. That or is semistrict is also clear. The 
definitions for "l" and "llc" are less obvious. We have chosen "l" to be 
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semistrict. It can also be chosen strict or nonstrict (cf. the ambiguity 
operator in (Broy, 1982)). The same holds for the parallel construct. It can 
be chosen strict, semistrict, or nonstrict. We decided to choose it semistrict 
again. Note, that fairness, unbounded nondeterminism, and nonstrictness of 
nondeterministic language constructs (i.e., "angelicness") are closely related. 
Note, that some of the confusions arising when trying to give a 
denotational style semantics to processes tem from the fact that in the 
powerdomain of demonic nondeterminism certain strict and semistrict 
functions are identified, while in the powerdomain of angelic nondeterminism 
certain semistrict and nonstrict functions are identified. 
Since these distinct powerdomains correspond to distinct notions of partial 
and total correctness, we have in analogy: strict and semistrict functions 
cannot be distinguished in the restricted notion of total correctness, while 
semistrict and nonstrict cannot be distinguished using partial correctness. 
6.5. Loosely Versus Tightly Coupled Systems 
The language CP defines systems of tightly coupled (also called 
synchronous) agents corresponding to the rendezvous concept. Other 
language proposals for communicating systems correspond to loosely 
coupled (asynchronous) ystems. The difference between these two concepts 
can now be made precise in our semantic models. 
In a loosely coupled system all language constructs c correspond to 
additive functions in the following sense: All language constructs can be 
defined by 
S[e(p)I(E) = 0 {f/(x): x C S[p](E)}, 
i--1 
where the f~ are continuous deterministic functions. As can be seen in the 
definitions above, the synchronized parallel composition or hiding cannot be 
defined that way. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the previous sections a comprehensive treatment of the semantics of a 
simple language for concurrent programming has been given. All the 
techniques used, however, carry over to "more realistic" languages not using 
just an alphabet of actions but a class of operations that change the 
environment and/or exchange information between processes. 
Although closely related we did not touch the issue of event structures as 
treated by (Nielsen et al., 1981; Lauer and Shields, 1980; Winkowski, 1980) 
and many others. However, it seems clear to me that an event structure 
semantics of CP can also be tackled in the framework as defined above. 
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APPENDIX I: 
SOME DEFINITIONS ON POWERSETS AND POWERDOMAINS 
In this section we give three powerdomain constructions based on the idea 
of ideal completions. We choose very particular representations for the 
elements of these powerdomains. A partially ordered set DOM is called 
countably algebraic domain if 
(1) every directed set S _ DOM has a least upper bound (lub), 
(2) the set of finite approximations of an element x is directed and 
every element x C DOM is lub of the set of its finite approximations 
x = lub{ y E DOM: y E_ x and y finite}, 
(3) the set of finite elements is countable. 
Here a set S c_ DOM is called directed if 
Vx, yE  S3z E S :x  E_z A y E_z. 
An element x ~ DOM is called finite, if for all directed sets S ~ DOM we 
have 
xE lubS=> 3yES:xEy ;  
DOM is called consistently complete, if every set S _~ DOM with an upper 
bound even, it has a least upper bound. Trivially then every set has a greatest 
lower bound (glb). Let DOM be a consistently complete, countably algebraic 
domain; for S, S1, $2 ~_ DOM we define 
MIN(S) = {x E S: ~/y C S: y E x ~ x = y}, 
MAX(S) = txC  S: Vy E S :xE_y~x=y},  
CLOSE(S) = {x ~ DOM: 3 SO ~ S: 
((¥a, b E S03z  E SO: 
aEz  AbEz)Ax=lubSO)  
V ((Va, b E SO 3z E SO: 
z E_ a A z _E b) A x = glb SO)}, 
UPC(S)= {x E DOM: 3y C S :y  C-x} 
DOC(S)= {xC DOM: ~yC S :x  F-y} 
CONE(S) = {x ~ DOM: 3y, z E S: y E_x F-Z}. 
S is called convex iff CONE(S) = S; S is called closed iff CLOSE(S) = S. 
We have 
CONE(S) = UPC(S) A DOC(S) 
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Trivially all these functions and notions on sets can be extended to set-valued 
functions and functionals over those functions by applying them elementwise. 
The following three preorderings are used (cf. Plotkin, 1976; Smyth, 
1978): 
S1Ee S2 iff Vx ~ S13y ~ S2: x E y, 
S1EMS2 iff VyCS2~x~SI :xEy ,  
S1EE~ tS2 iff S1EES2ASI_E  MS2. 
Over nonflat (nondiscrete) domains these relations just define preorderings. 
What sets are identified if we try to make these relations into orderings can 
be seen from 
LEMMA 1. For closed sets S1, $2 we have 
S1 E E $2 iff MAX(S1) E E MAX(S2), 
S1 E M $2 iff MIN(S1) E MMIN(S2). 
For arbitrary sets S1, $2 we have 
S1 E~ $2 iff UPC(S1) E M UPC(S2) 
S1 E_ES2 iff DOC(S1)_E EDOC(S2) 
S1 EEM $2 iff CONE(S1) EEM CONE(S2). 
$1 _E M $2 iff UPC(S2)_  UPC(S1) 
saEEs2  iff DOC(S1)~_DOC(S2) 
This lemma shows one pathological property of the powerdomains based 
on these "orderings": In a powerdomain particular distinct sets are 
considered as being equivalent, i.e., the powerdomain constructions actually 
consider classes of equivalent sets. But sets may not only be equivalent 
because they cannot be distinguished by the orderings above. Due to the 
principle of finite approximability and continuity two sets are considered to 
be equivalent in a countably algebraic powerdomain based on some ordering, 
iff the classes of finite sets of finite elements that approximate these sets in 
the sense of these orderings are identical. 
Let FDOM denote the set of finite elements from DOM. We take here a 
very concrete set-theoretic view of powerdomains. Their elements are just 
represented by subsets of P(DOM), i.e., by particular elements of the 
powerset over DOM. These representations are chosen in a very particular 
way which is most convenient for our semantic descriptions. The power 
domain PD(DOM) of erratic nondeterminism (also called Plotkin power 
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domain or Egli-Milner power domain) is defined as follows. The set of finite 
elements is represented by the convex hull of finite sets of finite elements 
GD= {CONE(S): S~ FDOM A ISI < oo}. 
We immediately can prove 
(GD, E~M) is po-set. 
PD(DOM) is defined as the ideal-completion of (GD, EeM). We choose as 
representation for PD(DOM) a subset of P(DOM), such that every ideal 
I ~ GD is represented by 
{xE DOM: VS1 E I ,  yE  FDOM: 
y E x~ 3S2 E I ,  S1 EEMS2, z E S2:y Ez  EX}. 
By 
PDOM: P (DOM)~ PD(DOM) 
we denote the function mapping every set S _~ DOM on its power domain 
representation. It is defined by 
PDOM(S) = {x ~ DOM: VS1 E GD, y C FDOM: 
yExAS1E_EMS 
=> ~$2 E GD, S1 E eMS2 EeMS, z C S2:y E z Ex}. 
Note, that we have chosen a ___-maximal representation for PDOM(S), i.e., 
the _~-maximal set in the class of sets that are E~M-equivalent w.r.t. _EeM- 
approximations by finite sets of finite elements. A proof is given in Lemma 2. 
The power domain of demonic nondeterminism (also called Smyth power' 
domain) is defined as 
GM= {UPC(S): S_~ FDOM A IS[ < oo}. 
One immediately can prove 
(GM, c_~t) is po-set. 
PMO(DOM) is the ideal completion of (GM, E~t). We choose as represen- 
tation for PMO(DOM) a subset of DOM, such that every ideal Ic_ GM is 
represented by 
{xE DOM: VS1 EI,  yE  FDOM: 
y Ex~ 3S2 E / ,S1  -----MS2, z E S2:y Ez  r-x}. 
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By 
PMDOMO: P(DOM) ~ PMO(DOM) 
we denote the function mapping every set S ~ DOM on its power domain 
representation. It is defined by 
PMDOMO(S) = {x E DOM: VS1 E GM, y C FDOM:y E x A S1 E MS 
~$2 E GM, S1 E MS2 E a~S,z E S2:y Ez  Ex}.  
All sets in PMO(DOM) are closed. Since we find it more convenient to work 
with a _c-minimal representation we define 
and 
with 
PM(DOM) = {MIN(S): S ___ PMO(DOM)} 
PMDOM: P(DOM)-~ PM(DOM) 
PMDOM(S) ----- MIN(PMDOMO(S)). 
Note, that we have chosen a _c-minimal representation for PMDOM(S), i.e., 
the ___-minimal set in the class of closed, finitely approximable sets that are 
E M-equivalent w.r.t. EM-approximations by finite sets of finite elements. A
proof is given in Lemma 2. 
The power domain of angelic nondeterminism (also called Hoare power 
domain) is defined as 
GE= {DOC(S): S c FDOM A IS[ < ~}. 
One immediately can prove 
(GE, EE) is po-set. 
PEO(DOM) is the ideal-completion of (GE, EE). We choose as represen- 
tation for PEO(DOM) a subset of DOM, such that every ideal !c  GE is 
represented by 
Ix E DOM: VS1 E I ,y C FDOM: 
yCx ~ ~S2 E I ,  S1 E ES2, z E S2: yEz  Ex  }. 
By 
PEDOMO: P(DOM) -, PEO(DOM) 
236 MANFRED BROY 
we denote the function mapping every set S ~ DOM on its power domain 
representation. It is defined by 
PEDOMO(S) = {xE DOM: VS1 E GE, y@ FDOM:y EX A $1 c_C_e S ~ 
3S2 C GE, S1 E_ES2 C e S ,z  ~ S2: y E_z E_x}. 
The sets in PEO(DOM) are closed. We may represent them also by their 
maximal elements. This leads to a ___-minimal representation for the power- 
domain of angelic nondeterminism. We define 
PE(DOM) = {MAX(S): S C PEO(DOM)} 
and 
with 
PEDOM: P(DOM)--, PE(DOM) 
PEDOM = MAX(PEDOMO(S)). 
Note, that we have chosen a _c-minimal representation for PEDOM(S), i.e., 
the c_-minimal set in the class of closed, finitely approximable sets that are 
E_e-equivalent w.r.t. E_E-approximations by finite sets of finite elements. (For 
a proof see Lemma 2.) 
Basically these powerdomains contain just those sets for which the 
respective relations form orderings and which can be approximated by finite 
sets of finite elements. They are isomorphic to (continuous) ideal 
completions of the representation class of finite sets of finite elements. 
For sets S1, $2 we define equivalence-relations: 
S1 ~EM $2 iff PDOM(S1) = PDOM(S2) 
$1 ~M $2 iff PMDOM(S1) = PMDOM(S2) 
$1 ~e $2 iff PEDOM(S1) = PEDOM(S2). 
These equivalence relations can also be described in another way according 
to the following lemma. 
LEMMA 2. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
For S1, $2 _~ DOM we have 
S 1 ~EM $2 iff VS _____ FDOM, I s I  < oo = (s  gEM S 1 ~ S E_E M $2) 
S1 ~MS2 iff VSc  FDOM, IS[ < oo: (S E_MS1 o S E MS2) 
S1 ~e $2 iffVS _~ FDOM, IS[ < oo: (S _EE S1 ~:~ S E_E $2) 
PDOM(S) = U {SO c DOS:  S ~eM SO} 
PMDOM(S)---- MIN(U {SO ~_ DOM: S ~ M SO }) 
PEDOM(S) = MAX(U SO ~ DOM: S ~e SO}). 
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Proof (1) + (2) + (3) are trivial in one direction, since in the definitions 
of PDOM, PMDOM, PEDOM it can simply be seen that PDOM(S) (and 
PMDOM(S) and PEDOM(S), resp.) only depends on the set of finite sets 
SO of finite elements with SO E e~tS. Now assume that $1 ~EMS2 and 
there is some S c FDOM, ISJ < m with S _EeM S1 but c~(S _~E.~ $2). Then 
either there exists exists some x E S such that there does not exist y2 ~ $2 
with xEy2  and there exists some yl  ES1 with xcy l ;  then 
yl  E PDOM(S1) but -~(yl ~ PDOM(S2)); or these exists some y2 ~ $2 
such that there does not exist x E S with x Ey2  and thus y2 C PDOM(S2) 
but ~(y2 E PDOM(S1)). The proofs of (2) and (3) are analogous. 
(4) If x C SO for some SO ~~4 S, then for every pair of approx- 
imations y ___ x, S1 CeM S (and thus S1 Ee~t SO) with S1 C GD, y C FDOM 
there exist approximations $2 ~ GD with S1 EeMS2 c~uS (and thus 
$2 E e M SO) with z ~ $2 such that y E z C x; hence x C PDOM(S). 
Now if x E PDOM(S), then S,-~eMS U {x} and thus x _ 
U {S1 c DOM: S~EMS1}. 
(5) In analogy to (4). 
(6) In analogy to (5). II 
The concept of finite observability over algebraic domains simply means, 
that two objects are equal iff their classes of finite approximations are iden- 
tical. 
LEMMA 3. Figure4 commutes. In particular MIN and MAX are 
continuous functions. 
Proof Lemma 3 is a corollary of Lemma 2. II 
On function domains we use the classical ordering. Given a domain D1 
ordered by _E, then the set of functions 
{f :D2~D1} 
P (DOM)  / ~" 
PD(DOM)  
PE  (DON)  ~ PM (DOM)  
PM DOM 
FIGURE 4 
643/61/3-5 
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with some given set (or domain) D2 can be simply ordered by 
f l  G ' f2  iff Yx E D2: f l (x )  Gf2(x).  
Analogously we write lub* for the lub on the function domain ordered 
by G*. 
Unfortunately the simple powerset without the empty set ordered by 
inclusion ordering does not form a domain. For very obvious reasons we do 
not accept he empty set as element, since the set of possible computations of
a nondeterministic program can never be empty. However (P(DOM)\{~}, 
_~) forms a predomain, i.e., it has all properties of a domain besides the 
existence of a least element. We restrict ourselves to closed sets, i.e., to sets S 
where with every directed set in S its least upper bound is also in S. This is 
motivated by the concept of finite observability. Every object should be 
determined by its finite approximations. 
Accordingly the power predomain of closed Sets is defined as 
PC(DOM) = {S ___ DOM: S = CLOSE(S)}. 
A function 
f: P(DOM) ~ P(DOM) 
is called closely union continuous iff 
f (CLOSE(U xi) = CLOSE(U f(x~)) 
for every _~-chain {Xi}iEN, X i ~ P(DOM). Similarly a functional 
T: (DOM -+ P(DOM)) -+ (DOM -- P(DOM)) 
is called closely union continuous iff 
7"[CLOSE • (U*4)] = CLOSE.  (U *v[4] )  
for every ___-chain (f/)i-=N, ft :DOM--*P(DOM) • Here denotes the 
composition of functions and 0 *f~ denotes the elementwise union of the set- 
valued function fi ,  i.e, 
(U U 
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APPENDIX II: PROOFS 
THEOREM. For every CP-program p and every perfect environment E, we 
have 
(1) the functional Tq::o(E ) is ~_*-monotonie and closely union 
continuous, 
(2) the functional PDOM.  Tq:w(E ) is E*~t-monotonic and E_z*M- 
continuous, 
(3) the functional PMDOM.  Tq:w(E ) is E_*-monotonic and E*- 
continuous, 
(4) the functional PEDOM. Tq::p(E) is E*-monotonic and E*- 
continuous. 
Proof All language constructs are mapped onto functions that can be 
represented in a very specific form, i.e., for a given environment they are 
functionals 
T: PROCESSi~ PROCESS, 
with i=  1, 2, where (let now w.l.o.g, i = 2), 
T[x, yl(s) = {h(ql, q2, d, s): ql ~ x(gl(s, d)) A q2 E y(g2(s, d)) 
A d ~ Z A r(ql, q2, d, s) E true}, 
where 
h: STREAM({A, R })~ X STREAM(H) × STREAM(ACTION) 
-~ STREAM({A, R }), 
r: STREAM({A, R })~ × STREAM(H) × STREAM(ACTION) ~ BOOL ±, 
gl, g2: STREAM(H) X STREAM(ACTION)~ STREAM(ACTION) 
are continuous functions, Z C PDOM(STREAM(H)), H is a finite set, and 
the predicate r is defined in a way, such that for every d C Z and all E EM- 
continuous processes xl, x2, yl ,  y2, with 
x 1 ~E~t x2, y 1 ~EM y2 
and all experiments sl, s2 with sl E s2 for all 
ql ~x l (g l ( s l ,  d)), q2Eyl(gZ(sl ,  d)), 
q3 E xZ(gl (s2, d)), q4 C yZ(gZ(s2, d)) 
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with ql E q3 and q2 E_ q4 there exists d' G S with 
gl(sl, d)=gl(sl ,  d'), g2(sl, d)=gE(sl, d') 
(thus ql E x(gl(s, d')), q2 E (g2(s, d'))), and 
r(ql, q2, d', sl) E_ true :~ r(q3, q4, d', s2) _Etrue, 
Moreover T[x,y](s) is never empty. 
Intuitively this property just says that taking a "more defined" process 
and continuing the experiment there exists at least one more (or equally) 
defined behavior. 
c_*-monotonicity. If 
xl c*  x2 ,y l~*y2  
(i.e., for all s: xl(s) _ x2(s),yl(s) c y2(s)) then trivially 
T[xl,yl ] c_* T[x2,y2]. 
Close union continuity. Now let {Xi}i~N, {Yi}i~N he c-chains with xi, 
Yt ~ PROCESS, and 
x=(. J*x i, y=l..)*y i. 
If q E CLOSE(T[x, y](s)), then there exist q~ ~ T[x, y](s), where 
{qi}i=-U forms a __-chain 
with q = lub {qi}. Thus for every i there are j with 
q, C T[xj,yj](s); 
hence qi E (.) T[xa,yj](s) and so. : . . . . . .  
q ~ CLOSE(U T[xg,yj](s)). 
E*M-monotonicity. Assume 
xl * C_~MX2, yl E'MY2 
(i.e. for all s: xl(s)EEMX2(S),yl(s)Ez~,y2(s)). For 
there exist 
qxl @ xl(gl(s, d)), qyl ~ yl(g2(s, d)), 
qx2 ~ x2(gl(s, d)), qy2 E y2(g2(s, d)) 
with 
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qxl E_ qx2, qyl E qy2. 
According to the monotonicity of h we have 
h(qxl, qyl, d, s) E h(qx2, qy2, d, s) 
and according to the properties of r we can choose d such that 
h(qxl, qyl, d, s) E T[xl,yl](s) 
h(qx2, qy2, d, s) E r[x2, y2 ](s). 
Thus T must be _e-monotonic. If
qx2 E xZ(gl(s, d)), qy2 E yZ(g2(s, d)), 
then there exist 
with 
qxl E xl(gl(s, d)), qyl E yl(g2(s, d)) 
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qxl E qx2, qyl E_ qy2. 
According to the monotonicity of h we have 
h(qxl, qyl, d, s) E h(qx2, qy2, d, s) 
and according to the properties of r we can choose d such that 
h(qxZ, qy2, d, s) E T[x2, y2 ](s) 
h(qxl, qyl, d, s) E T[xl, yl ](s). 
Thus T must be cM-monotonic. From E_M-monotonicity and _E e- 
monotonicity together we obtain c eM-monotonicity. 
c*~-eontinuity. Now let {xi}t~, {Yi}ie]v be E'M-chains with x;, 
Yi E PROCESS, and 
x(s) = Ee~t-lub {PDOM(xi(s)) }, y(s) = Eea4-1ub {PDOM(Yi(S))}. 
The Ce~4-monotonicity immediately gives 
C_eM-lub {PDOM(T[x,, y,] (s))} gem PDOM(TIx, y] (s)). 
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then there exist 
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q E PDOM(T[x,  y] (s)) 
with 
d E Z, qx E PDOM(x(gl(s, d))), qy E PDOM(y(g2(s, d))) 
q = h(qx, qy, d, s), 
Then there exist 
qx i E PDOM(xi( gl(s, d))), 
with 
and 
We have 
Thus 
If 
then there exist 
with 
r(qx, qy, d, s) E true. 
qYi E PDOM(yi(g2(s, d))) 
qi = h(qxi, qYi, d, s), r(qx i, qYi, d, s) E true. 
lub{qxi} =qx, lub{qyi} =qy. 
qt E T[xi, yi](s) with q = lub {qi}" 
q E E_EM-lub PDOM(T[xi, yi](s)). 
q ~ E_eM-lUb PDOM(T[xi, Yi](s)), 
qi E PDOM(T[xi, Yi](s)) 
q = lub{qi}. 
Then according to the continuity of h, r, gl,  and g2, 
q(s) = lubIqi(s) /~ T[EeM-lub*IPDOM • xi}, E--~M -lub* { PDOM" Yi}](s) 
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and 
and 
THEOREM. For every CP-program p we have 
cap(p) = CAP(S[p](E I) ), 
i.e., S[pl(E a) is extensionally equivalent to the operational semantics and S 
is consistent. 
Proof We prove the theorem by structural induction on the structure of 
the terms of the syntactic unit (agent). For the nonrecursive agents this can 
be done straightforwardly b checking the consistency of the definition of the 
relation defining the operational semantics with the definition of S. 
Let now q::p be an agent where no recursively defined agents occur in p. 
Define 
qo =p[abort/q], qi+~ =P[qi/q]. 
Let furthermore Tq::p be defined as in Section4.3. According to the 
construction there we have 
MIN(cap(q: p)) = MIN(CAP(S [q::pl(Ex))) = CAP(MIN • S [q::p](El)), 
since for all experiments s, 
MIN (S[p: :q](E)(s)) = MIN (SIP: :q](E)(s)) = ~- lub  { MIN(S [qi] (E)(s))}, 
S [qi] (E)(s) = T~:..p(E±)[p](s), 
MIN(cap(q::p)) = _EM-lUb {MIN(cap(qi))}. 
Moreover the fixed point property of cap(q::p) immediately gives then 
CAP(S[q::p](E I) ) ~ cap(q::p). 
and so 
T[x, y](s) E~,~t ~eM-lub{PDOM(T[xi, yi](s)) }. 
Thus we obtain 
PDOM(T[x, y](s)) = ~M-lub{PDOM(T[x i, Yi] (s)) }. 
Trivially then PMDOM • T=MIN.  PDOM • T and PEDOM. T--  
MAX • PDOM • T are _EM-monotonic and E~t-continuous and E E- 
monotonic and E e-continuous, respectively, since MIN and MAX are 
monotonic and continuous functions. II 
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If s ~ cap(q:.T) is finite, then by induction on the length of s one easily 
proves s~CAP(S[p] (E I )  ). If s is infinite, then s is maximal, i.e., 
s ~ CAP(S[q:'.p](E±)) iff s ~ PDOM(CAP(S[q: ' .p] (E3)  . For reasons of 
EEM-continuity we have 
cap(q::p) E PDOM(CAP(S [q::pl(E ±))), 
so s @ CAP(S[q::p](Ez) . I 
THEOREM. The denotational semantics defined by S1 is ful ly abstract. 
Proof. Assume pl ,  p2 are agents with P1 = SI [p l ] (E±) ,  
P2=SI [p2] (E~) ,  P1, P2CPROCESS with PLOP2.  Then there exists 
some experiment s~STREAM(ACTION)  with (w.l.o.g) q EP l ( s )  but 
~(q E P2(s)). Let (w,l.o.g.) s be finite with 
s=s  0 & ... &s,&e.  
Let furthermore c be the set of actions occuring in s. If 
then 
but 
If 
then 
but 
If 
q = A i, 
So & "" & si & e ~ cap(pl),  
-~(s o & ... & s t & e E cap(p2)). 
q =A'o <±>, 
s o & . . .  & s ,&  (2)  C cap(pl), 
-~(s o & ... & s i &(L  ) C cap(p2)). 
q=Ai  o R j, 
then consider the agent C[p]: 
P IIC (So ~ "'" "~ Si---~ ((Si+I-~ sk ip) I  "" I (si+~ skip)).  
Obviously 
but 
SEMANTICS OF COMMUNICATING PROCESSES 
s o & ... &s  i&  (L )  ~ cap(C[pl]), 
-~(s o &. . .  & s~& (5_) C cap(C[p2]) ). II 
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